

before the rights of admission and exclusion can be exercised. For these rights are to be exercised only by the community as a whole (even if, in practice, some national majority dominates the decision-making) and only with regard to foreigners, not by some members with regard to others. No community can be half-metic, half-citizen, and claim that its admissions policies are acts of self-determination or that its politics is democratic.

The determination of aliens and guests by an exclusive band of citizens (or of slaves by masters, or women by men, or blacks by whites, or conquered peoples by their conquerors) is not communal freedom but oppression. The citizens are free, of course, to set up a club, make membership as exclusive as they like, write a constitution, and govern one another. But they can't claim territorial jurisdiction and rule over the people with whom they share the territory. To do this is to act outside their sphere, beyond their rights. It is a form of tyranny. Indeed, the rule of citizens over non-citizens, of members over strangers, is probably the most common form of tyranny in human history. I won't say much more than this about the special problems of non-citizens and strangers: henceforth, whether I am talking about the distribution of security and welfare or about hard work or power itself, I shall assume that all the eligible men and women hold a single political status. This assumption doesn't exclude other sorts of inequality further down the road, but it does exclude the piling up of inequalities that is characteristic of divided societies. The denial of membership is always the first of a long train of abuses. There is no way to break the train, so we must deny the rightfulness of the denial. The theory of distributive justice begins, then, with an account of membership rights. It must vindicate at one and the same time the (limited) right of closure, without which there could be no communities at all, and the political inclusiveness of the existing communities. For it is only as members somewhere that men and women can hope to share in all the other social goods—security, wealth, honour, office, and power—that communal life makes possible.

## COMMUNITY AND CITIZENSHIP

DAVID MILLER

[. . .] It is often said that proposals for market socialism effectively abandon the traditional socialist commitment to community.<sup>1</sup> Socialism cannot be understood simply in terms of policy outcomes—the distribution of consumption goods and so forth. It is also fundamentally concerned with the quality of human relationships in so far as these are affected by social institutions. I [have] argued [. . .] that the apparently anti-communitarian character of market relations might be offset if the market were made the subject of deliberate political choice. This argument does not take us the whole way. It shows that where community exists, and finds political expression, the presence of markets need not destroy it, but we have still to show how community is possible in the first place in modern, economically developed societies. Markets alone cannot provide it, even if they can be contained within it.

At the same time, we need to probe the commitment to community itself. What does it mean for relationships to be communitarian, and why should their being so be valued? How, in particular, does a socialist view of community differ from conservative and liberal views?<sup>2</sup> We must allow the possibility that some forms of community are in fact antithetical to other equally important, socialist ideals, so that socialist

David Miller, excerpts from *Market, State, and Community*, 227–51. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press.

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., A. Buchanan, *Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market* (Oxford, 1985), 106–9.

<sup>2</sup> For the contested character of the concept of community, see R. Plant, 'Community: Concept, Conception and Ideology', *Politics and Society*, 8

communitarianism must be discriminating. We must even consider whether socialists should abandon communitarian commitments altogether. These questions answered, we can return to the practical issue of how community can be realized, and what, in particular, it implies for the politics of socialism. [ . . . ]

## 2

The promise of overall community, then, is that it allows people to regard themselves as active subjects shaping the world according to their will; and that it undergirds the distributive arrangements to which socialists (especially) are committed. But now we must begin to ask how, if at all, this promise can be fulfilled in the advanced industrial societies on which our discussion is focused.

The collective identities that people currently possess are predominantly national identities. Here, if anywhere, it seems, the promise of overall community must be redeemed.<sup>3</sup> But the socialist tradition has been overwhelmingly hostile to nationality as a source of identity, usually regarding it merely as an artificially created impediment to the brotherhood of man. And, of course, the historical conjunct 'national socialism' is rightly regarded with the utmost abhorrence.

Despite the weight of this tradition, I believe we need to mount a rescue operation on behalf of nationality if we are to have any hope of providing a socialist theory of community that respects the limits already identified. This operation will have

(1978), 79-107. For the breadth of its appeal, see R. Nisbet, *The Quest for Community* (New York, 1953). For an assessment of the recent revival of communitarian thought from a socialist perspective, see my 'In what sense must socialism be communitarian?', *Social Philosophy and Policy* 6(1989), 57-74.

<sup>3</sup> Socialists need not take a stand on the question whether it is ultimately preferable for there to be a plurality of national communities or a single global community. The point is that a feasible form of socialism must begin from the communal identities people actually have, not those which it might be abstractly desirable for them to have. There is presently no sign that national identities are on the wane. In so far as there is any movement, it appears to be in the direction of smaller, more intense forms of nationality rather than towards cosmopolitanism.

two phases. First, I separate the idea of nationality itself from various accretions that have given nationalism a bad name, on the left especially. Second, I try to defuse the charge that nationality is an essentially irrational phenomenon, and therefore an inadmissible basis on which to found a socialist project that aspires to be rational.

What does it mean for people to have a common national identity, to share their nationality? It is essentially not a matter of the objective characteristics that they possess, but of their shared beliefs:<sup>4</sup> a belief that each belongs together with the rest; that this association is neither transitory nor merely instrumental, but stems from a long history of living together which (it is hoped and expected) will continue into the future; that the community is marked off from other communities by its members' distinctive characteristics; that each member recognizes a loyalty to the community, expressed in a willingness to sacrifice personal goals to advance its interests; and that the community should enjoy a measure of political autonomy, normally (but not I think necessarily) in the form of a sovereign state.<sup>5</sup> Where these beliefs are widely held throughout the population in question, we have sufficient grounds for saying that a nation exists.

What needs underlining is how little this definition includes. It contains no assumption that nations are, as it were, natural kinds marked off from one another by physical characteristics. It can easily accommodate the historical fluidity of national identities, and recognize the extent to which nations are brought into being by extraneous circumstances such as conflicts between states. Nor is there any assumption that people who share a nationality will share objective characteristics such as race or language.<sup>6</sup> It is indeed possible that people's *beliefs* about these characteristics may form part of particular national

<sup>4</sup> See B. Barry, 'Self-Government Revisited', in D. Miller and L. Siedentop (eds.), *The Nature of Political Theory* (Oxford, 1983).

<sup>5</sup> I hope there is no need to labour the conceptual distinction between a state (a political institution) and a nation (a group of people with shared beliefs of the appropriate kind), nor to dwell on the reasons why most nationalities aspire to form their own sovereign states.

<sup>6</sup> For the sake of argument I assume that race is an objective characteristic, though clearly this might be disputed.

identities—for instance, that it is part of (French) people's understanding of what it is to be French that one should speak the French language—but this is quite a different matter. Moreover, the salient characteristics may vary from case to case: one nation may define itself by race, another by religion, a third by nothing more than common history. (In fact these examples are too simple. If we think about existing national identities, we quickly realize that they are almost without exception made up of an array of characteristics, none of which is regarded as strictly necessary to being Italian, Japanese, etc.)

The definition is minimal in another respect too. It embodies no assumptions about how nations ought to behave towards one another. In particular, it does not include the idea that nations are ethically unrestricted, so that powerful nations may justifiably impose themselves on the weak. All that nationality, as such, includes is the idea that one owes a special loyalty to one's compatriots. Now it is certainly true that acknowledging a loyalty of this kind means favouring the interests of members of the group at the expense of outsiders in certain circumstances. That is what loyalty means: talk of impersonal loyalty, or loyalty to the human race as a whole, is meaningless, except in science fiction cases. But to acknowledge loyalty to a group need not imply being ethically indifferent to outsiders, much less being willing to trample on their interests in the name of the group.

Most socialists see the value in attachments to primary groups.<sup>7</sup> They see that owing a special loyalty to your work-mates or your neighbours does not exclude caring about and supporting wider constituencies. (Indeed, as I argued earlier, they have often taken such a rosy view of this relationship that they have ignored the structural problems of inter-group relations.) Why, then, should national loyalties be looked on with disfavour? Perhaps it is the fact that national groupings are normally co-extensive with states, so that the group has the organized power to inflict damage on outside groups, if it so wishes. But this, it seems to me, is simply an unavoidable corollary of the feature which should make nationality *attractive*

<sup>7</sup> Most, but not all. Godwin was the best-known exponent of the view that one must be rigorously impartial in one's treatment of fellow human beings. But Godwin was in any case an odd sort of socialist, if indeed one at all.

to socialists as a form of community. It is precisely the conjunction of nation and state that makes it possible for national communities to approach the ideals of self-determination and distributive justice sketched in the previous section. Only a politically organized community can aspire to shape its own future and to distribute resources throughout its membership according to need.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, the power which enables it to do this will also, if misused, allow it to damage other communities in ways that are too familiar to need rehearsing.

My strategy so far has been to separate nationality, as the idea that socialists should hold on to and favour, from nationalism—a rather inchoate notion, often thought to encompass (a) the idea that nations are distinct, immutable chunks of humanity, and/or (b) the idea that national allegiances are to be fostered at the expense of all other commitments, whether wider or narrower, and/or (c) the idea that nations may aggress against each other as forcefully as they are able. These latter ideas may all lead to repugnant conclusions, but their connection with nationality as such is no stronger than, say, the connection between football violence and loyalty to one's chosen team. All particularist loyalties create at least the *potential* for objectionable behaviour towards outsiders, but to conclude that we should never pledge ourselves to anything less than humanity as a whole is to overlook everything that is valuable in these special commitments.<sup>9</sup>

There is, however, a further issue that we must consider before allowing nationality to stand as our idea of overall

<sup>8</sup> Obviously nation-states are constrained to a varying extent by the international economic and political environment in which they have to act. I do not mean to imply that any nation can be fully self-determining in the sense of facing no external impediments at all. Nor would I deny that some nations are constrained to an extent that makes their nominal self-determination fairly meaningless. I would simply reiterate that nationality, where it works, holds out a promise that socialists should find very attractive, in a world that falls far short of utopia.

<sup>9</sup> For explorations of the value of such commitments, see A. Oldenquist, 'Loyalties', *Journal of Philosophy*, 74 (1982), 173–93; J. Cottingham, 'Parity, Favouritism and Morality', *Philosophical Quarterly*, 36 (1986), 357–73; P. Pettit, 'Social Holism and Moral Theory', *Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society*, 86 (1985–6), 173–97. I have looked more fully at the ethical issues raised by national allegiances in 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', *Ethics*, 98 (1987–8), 647–62.

community. A socialist view of community, unlike certain conservative views, must embody a condition of rationality. Members of the community must be able to subject their relationship to critical scrutiny without destroying it. This follows from socialist egalitarianism—there is no privileged caste holding the rest of society in intellectual thrall—together with the idea that the community is an active agent reshaping the world in accordance with its purposes. Now it is often suggested that national ‘communities’ are in one important sense fictitious, for it is characteristic of nations that their identities are not formed through spontaneous processes of self-definition, but primarily according to the exigencies of power—the demands of states seeking to assure themselves of the loyalty of their subjects. Nationality is to a greater or lesser degree a manufactured item. This is brought out in Anthony Smith’s recent study of the formation of nations out of older ethnic communities.<sup>10</sup> Smith distinguishes broadly between two cases. In the first, the nation is based on a single dominant ethnic group, and the culture of that group is imposed more or less successfully on ethnic minorities falling within the territorial boundaries of the emergent nation. In the second, a dominant culture is lacking, and has to be forged in order to create a nation out of a series of disparate ethnic groups. In both cases, but especially the second, nation-building is a work of invention, in particular the invention of a common national past. As Smith puts it:

If the nation is to become a ‘political community’ on the Western territorial and civic model, it must, paradoxically, seek to create those myths of descent, those historical memories and that common culture which form the missing elements of their ethnic make-up, along with a mutual solidarity. It must differentiate itself from its closest neighbours, distinguish its culture from theirs, and emphasize the historic kinship of its constituent *ethnie* and their common ties of ideological affinity. This is done by creating or elaborating an ‘ideological’ myth of origins and descent.<sup>11</sup>

Let us take it, then, that nations require histories which are to a greater or lesser degree ‘mythical’ (as judged by the standards of impartial scholarship); and that those stories are not

<sup>10</sup> A. D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* 147.

only needed at the time during which a national identity is first being created, but pass into that identity itself—so that, in order to understand what it means to be French or Greek, one has to accept (some version of)<sup>12</sup> the common story. Do these facts imply that national loyalties cannot withstand rational reflection?

To answer this question, we need to make a distinction between beliefs that are constitutive of social relationships, and background beliefs which support those constitutive beliefs. To illustrate the former, consider the example of friendship. For *A* and *B* to be friends, it must minimally be true that each is willing to put himself out for the other. Suppose that *A* believes this of *B*, but in fact the belief is false. *B* is merely a fair-weather friend: should an occasion arise on which he is called on to sacrifice something for *A*’s sake, he will certainly renege. *A*’s loyalties to *B* are then drained of their value, since the reciprocal attitudes that constitute friendship are not in place. An indicator of this is that *A*, if he is rational, must want to be informed if indeed it is the case that his ‘friendship’ is not being reciprocated.<sup>13</sup>

But now consider a different case. Suppose there is a family, call them the Smiths, who exemplify all the best features of that relationship: there is love, mutual support, and a wide range of activities performed in common. If asked what it was that made these attitudes to one another appropriate, the Smiths would point, among other things, to the fact that members of the family were biologically related. Suppose now that, owing to some dreadful mix-up at the hospital, one of the Smith children is in fact not a Smith. We can then say that the family relationship is backed up by a false belief: the love and concern they feel for one another is supported by a supposed genetic connection which in one case fails to obtain. But a falsity of this kind doesn’t mean that the attachment of each member to the family is itself

<sup>12</sup> Very often political disputes within a nation will surface as disputes about the precise character of the national past—e.g. the intense competition between ‘Whig’ and ‘Tory’ accounts of English history in eighteenth-century Britain. But the competing accounts will recognizably be different versions of the same general story, with many basic facts not in dispute.

<sup>13</sup> If *A* resists the passing on of this information, then the emotion he feels for *B* is not friendship but love, which (proverbially) is blind.

valueless. The *constitutive* beliefs are all in order; each does genuinely identify with the family unit, and his beliefs about the others' attitudes are correct. In contrast to the first case, it would not be rational in these circumstances to want to have the false belief brought to light.<sup>14</sup>

If we apply this distinction to the case of nations, the imagined national past, which as we have seen appears to be an essential element in the process of nation-building, must count as a background (rather than constitutive) belief. It does of course matter (given my definition on pp. 87-8) that nations should see their identities as extending over time, but the constitutive belief is only that there should be some national past. The particular story which a nation tells itself about its past is a background belief. It is important that the story should be generally believed—or, to put the point more precisely, that there should be substantial convergence in the versions of the story that are believed<sup>15</sup>—but not that it should be historically accurate. Indeed, since the story is told for purpose of self-definition, and since the nation's self-definition bears on the goals that its members will try to pursue in the future, we should expect a dynamic nation, actively engaged in critical debate on its common purposes, regularly to reinterpret the past as well.

But there may be doubts whether the distinction I have invoked can do all the work that it is needed to do. For even if we can successfully interpret the national past as a background belief, we may not be able to do the same with the national present. Nations need a common view about what they now are; a view about what distinguishes membership of this nation from

<sup>14</sup> Some may think that it is always rational to divest yourself of irrational beliefs, but this is a superficial view. Here we are on Jon Elster territory; see, e.g., the discussion of 'decisions to believe' in his *Ulysses and the Sirens* (Cambridge, 1979), sect. ii. 3. The essential point is that there may be beliefs which it is valuable for a person to have in the light of his underlying goals, in which case it is rational for him to set up mechanisms which ensure that he has them (and if necessary protect the beliefs from later rational scrutiny).  
<sup>15</sup> See n. 12.

<sup>16</sup> Not important from the point of view of constituting the nation. In a wider perspective, it may make a good deal of difference how far removed the national myths are from historical truth. If the distance is great, this may have serious repercussions for scholarly research and intellectual toleration generally.

membership of others. To use an old-fashioned phrase, they need some conception of 'national character'. But, it might be urged, these beliefs are also to a large extent mythical, in the sense that they attribute a spurious homogeneity to a set of people who, if looked at objectively, vary enormously in values, life-styles, cultural attributes, and so on. And this observation destroys a *constitutive* belief, because it is constitutive of national identity that members of a nation should have characteristics in common which make it appropriate for them to be lumped together politically, rather than parcelled out in some other way. Take away 'national character' and all we are left with is *de facto* boundaries between states.

To meet this objection, we need to be able to draw a distinction between a public culture that is shared by all who belong to a particular nation and the various private cultures that may flourish inside it. Since we have rejected objective definitions of nationality, 'national character' must be interpreted in cultural terms—in terms of beliefs and attitudes, ritual observances, and so forth. But given the cultural variety that we observe in most modern nations, it is also clear that the common culture we are looking for must be of a relatively thin kind—it cannot embrace all the rich cultural attributes that particular sections of the society may possess. This raises the issue of how such a public/private distinction can be drawn. Is it possible to have a viable sense of nationality without trespassing in the realm of private culture, or will there be areas in which we have to choose between maintaining national identity and encouraging cultural pluralism? [. . .] Here I have tried to sketch in a minimalist view of nationality which on the one hand is substantial enough to serve as an idea of community, but on the other hand is sufficiently free of irrationalist elements to allow socialists to consider stomaching it.

Nations are the only possible form in which overall community can be realized in modern societies. But a nation needs the right kind of political organization if it is to satisfy socialist ideals. I shall describe this organization in terms of citizenship.

Nationality and citizenship complement one another. Without a common national identity, there is nothing to hold citizens together, no reason for extending the role just to these people and not to others. Without citizenship, nationality cannot fulfil the activist idea of a community of people determining its own future; it is at risk of becoming a merely traditional form of association in which received ways of doing things are continued without critical scrutiny. Nationality gives people the common identity that makes it possible for them to conceive of shaping their world together. Citizenship gives them the practical means of doing so.

Citizenship here must mean something more than merely being subject to the laws of a state, which is often how the term is now understood. It must be a social role which is partly, but not wholly, defined in terms of rights.<sup>17</sup> Let us take the rights first. It is conventional to distinguish analytically between three kinds of rights that citizens enjoy. First, there are protective rights, rights safeguarding the private freedom and security of each citizen against invasion by others. Second, there are political rights, rights to take part in decision-making in whatever political arenas the society in question provides. Third, there are welfare rights, rights guaranteeing a level of provision of goods and services that admits the citizen to full membership of his community.<sup>18</sup>

The distinction here is analytical only, because the whole thrust of the citizenship idea is that the different kinds of rights support each other. Protective and welfare rights provide a secure basis upon which the citizen can launch into his political role. The sense of common membership that the exercise of political rights (together with nationality) fosters underpins the obligation to provide for the welfare of fellow citizens. Taken together, the rights confer an equality of status upon

<sup>17</sup> I assume for the time being that this is an appropriate way of understanding citizenship. [ . . . ]

<sup>18</sup> The best-known analysis of citizenship as a status linking the three kinds of rights is T. H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', in *Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays* (London, 1963). The implications of citizenship for social policy are drawn out in J. Parker, *Social Policy and Citizenship* (London, 1975). The best critical analysis of the tradition as a whole is D. Harris, *Justifying State Welfare* (Oxford, 1987).

citizens which, it is claimed, bolsters their self-respect. Although inequalities of other kinds may persist, each can draw comfort from the fact that, in the basic political arrangements of his society, he is treated as an equal.<sup>19</sup> Testimony to the force of this idea is provided by the popularity, even in present-day political debate, of the phrase 'second-class citizen'. To say that someone is a second-class citizen is to say that, although nominally holding citizen status, he is deprived in some way that robs him of self-respect—hence he is not, in the full sense, a citizen of this society. It is an argument for adding a new right to the definition of citizenship, or for ensuring that an existing right is properly protected.

This observation may also, however, create anxieties about the whole idea. Isn't the notion of citizenship so amorphous that it can be appealed to in order to resolve any and every issue of social policy? Recall that we are trying to translate the idea of community into a form that leaves room for a sphere of 'civil society' in which private associations and market relations hold sway. How can we be sure that the contents of this sphere will not have to be determined politically in the name of citizenship?

Certainly some forms of private association seem incompatible with the citizenship idea. The most obvious case is slavery. The subservient position held by the slave excludes him from citizenship, as the Greeks understood. A more pertinent case for us is that of people subject to wide-ranging paternalism, such as the inhabitants of Pullman, Illinois, under the hegemony of George Pullman. Michael Walzer concludes that Pullman's well-meaning domination of the lives of the workers who lived in his town ('his' because all the property and the services were owned by Pullman) was incompatible with democratic citizenship. 'George Pullman hired himself a metic population in a political community where self-respect was closely tied to citizenship and where decisions about destinations and risks, even (or especially) local destinations and risks, were supposed to be shared.'<sup>20</sup> Citizenship requires independent citizens who

<sup>19</sup> This argument is found in J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), 544–5, though Rawls resists extending its scope beyond civil and political rights to welfare rights.

<sup>20</sup> M. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (Oxford, 1983), 297.

are not continually forced to conform their wills to other people's outside the political realm, but have sufficient autonomy in their private lives to gain experience in exercising judgement.<sup>21</sup> It has, therefore, social preconditions.<sup>22</sup> But it does not follow that every aspect of civil society must be geared to the production of citizens, or that there is no space left for market relationships. Under normal circumstances, the independence of action that people enjoy in market contexts is compatible with the requirements of citizenship.<sup>23</sup>

Citizenship, however, is not just a matter of possessing rights, even if these are broadly interpreted. It is also a matter of belief and behaviour. The citizen has to see himself as playing an active role in determining his society's future, and as taking responsibility for the collective decisions that are made. He must be politically active, both in the sense of informing himself about the issues currently under discussion and in the sense of participating in decision-making itself. Moreover, he cannot regard politics merely as an arena in which to pursue his private interests. He must act *as* a citizen, that is as a member of a collectivity who is committed to advancing its common good. We have said that, for the socialist, the sought-after common identity must be an activist one. This has now to be cashed out as a specific way of engaging in politics.

[... Later] I [shall] look more closely at the form of politics

<sup>21</sup> The argument here can, of course, be run in either direction. I am assuming the value of universal citizenship and inferring that social life ought to be ordered in such a way that everyone develops the capacities of a citizen. An earlier generation of liberals took social relations as given, and argued for the restriction of citizenship to those who were competent to exercise it. See my 'Democracy and Social Justice', *British Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1978), 1-19, repr. in P. Birmbaum, J. Lively, and G. Parry (eds.), *Democracy, Consensus and Social Contract* (London, 1978).

<sup>22</sup> These are explored in D. S. King and J. Waldron, 'Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision', *British Journal of Political Science*, 18 (1988), 415-43.

<sup>23</sup> The structure of enterprises will be of considerable significance here. If workers are directly involved in the making of economic decisions, as they are under market socialist arrangements, they are more likely to be active in politics, and hence better prepared for citizenship. For empirical confirmation of this, see E. S. Greenberg, 'Industrial Democracy and the Democratic Citizen', *Journal of Politics*, 43 (1981), 964-81.

which is demanded by the citizenship ideal, and ask whether it is a realistic possibility. At this point, we need only consider the feasibility of the ideal in general terms. Note first that, although the rights of citizenship must be distributed equally to everyone, it isn't necessary that each person should display the same level of political activity. Citizenship requires *some* level of political involvement (and equal opportunities beforehand), but it can allow for differences in taste. Michael Walzer has reminded us that there are ineradicable variations in people's desire for participation, and it would be intolerable to try to iron these out by making a high level of involvement compulsory.<sup>24</sup> There is no need to do so. Citizens can regard themselves as equals, and regard their common status as important, even though they are active to different degrees, just as members of a club can attach equal weight to membership even though they make varying use of the facilities provided.

But can citizenship be an important status in the first place? Scepticism about this claim extends from Marx's somewhat abstract argument that, so long as the division between civil society and state remains in existence, man's membership of the political community must be illusory—'man is the imaginary member of an imaginary sovereignty, divested of his real, individual life, and infused with an unreal universality'<sup>25</sup>—down to Robert Lane's empirical critique of the Rawlsian assertion that the possession and exercise of political rights is an important source of self-esteem.<sup>26</sup> What unites Marx and Lane, unlikely bedfellows in other respects, is the conviction that what really matters to people is the world of work and immediate personal relationship. For Marx, genuine communal relationships must be rooted in the sphere of production; for Lane, it is work, leisure, and family life that provide the major sources of self-esteem. The realm of politics is too distant and intangible for participation in it to be personally meaningful.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup> M. Walzer, 'A Day in the Life of a Socialist Citizen', in *Obligations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970).

<sup>25</sup> K. Marx, 'On the Jewish Question', in *Karl Marx: Early Writings*, ed. T. B. Bottomore (London, 1963), 13-14.

<sup>26</sup> R. E. Lane, 'Government and Self-Esteem', *Political Theory*, 10 (1982), 5-31.

<sup>27</sup> Lane's claim is that as a matter of psychological fact political life is

It is tempting to write off these criticisms (and others like them) as merely a response to the limited form of citizenship available in capitalist societies—intuitive in Marx's case, empirically grounded in Lane's. Certainly we need to envisage very different institutions of citizenship—in particular, many more arenas of participation—if the ideal I have been sketching is to become a reality. But one essential contrast between private (including economic) life and political life would still remain. Broadly speaking, in the former realm we experience the results of our activity personally and directly—we see the object we have made, we bear the costs of our own decisions—whereas in the latter realm our voice is always one among many, and our collective decisions normally have quite a remote impact on our lives. Isn't it this almost truisitic observation that finally justifies Marx's and Lane's scepticism?

In fact, although the observation is truisitic, to infer from it that politics must always play a peripheral role in people's lives is to make a contestable assumption about human nature. The assumption is that material activity, activity which has immediate and tangible results, always counts for more than expressive and symbolic activity. This tenet has only to be spelt out for its frailty to be evident. If it were true, many things would be difficult to explain—the pre-eminent role of religion in many societies, for instance, or the motivating power of nationalism as an ideology capable of stimulating enormous self-sacrifice on behalf of the fatherland. That we find such experiences alien (and usually alarming) is a fact about the public culture of liberal societies, not the reflection of a truth about human nature. In liberal culture the person who is deeply engaged in politics is regarded with suspicion—either he is a fanatic, the victim of irrational impulses, or he is an opportunist, cloaking his ambition in idealist rhetoric. In ancient Greece, by contrast, this pre-

of marginal importance to citizens. Marx, writing in a somewhat different context, insists rather on the unreal quality of citizenship (the analogy with religion is used throughout). That is, political life may seem important to the citizen, but in believing this he is somehow deceived. (Marx doesn't explain why the belief is illusory; perhaps he is anticipating his later view that the state appears to act independently, but is in reality subordinate to the needs of civil society.)

sumption was reversed: the person who *withdrew* from normal political life was seen as deficient, as 'idiotic'.<sup>28</sup>

None of this addresses the practical difficulties involved in revivifying the role of citizen for the inhabitants of large, modern societies. To do so requires the exercise of some imagination.<sup>29</sup> The effort will be worthwhile only if the case made above for valuing citizenship is accepted. If so, we should not be deterred by current, disparaging attitudes towards political life. We should take a broader view.

## 4

How does this vision of community, combining nationality with citizenship, fare when tested against our original touchstone, the radical communitarian vision of Morris and Co.? We have abandoned the idea that communal relationships must be unitary. Instead people are related to one another in a number of different ways—as friends, as competitors in the market, as citizens, and so forth. This introduces an element of artifice into the relationship. We have to decide whether, on a particular occasion, our interaction should be governed by the norms of economic competition, say, or political loyalty. We will need markers to separate the various realms of existence from each other.<sup>30</sup> The transparency and simplicity of human intercourse in the radical vision is replaced by something more familiar, but not, I believe, less attractive. There is in the end something rather flat and insipid about life in the communist utopia, where all dealings between people are informed by the same sentiments of universal good will. Perhaps the idea of role-playing, and of coping with the dilemmas that arise when role-requirements are

<sup>28</sup> See C. Berry, 'Idiotic Politics', *Political Studies*, 27 (1979), 550–63, and more generally H. Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, 1958), ch. 2.

<sup>29</sup> I. J. For fuller discussions, see B. Barber, *Strong Democracy* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984), ch. 10, and P. Green, *Retrieving Democracy* (London, 1985), ch. 9.

<sup>30</sup> Bob Goodin's discussion of how the moral realm is kept free from contamination by more mundane motives illustrates this idea. See R. Goodin, 'Making Moral Incentives Pay', *Policy Sciences*, 12 (1980), 131–45.

felt to conflict, will seem on reflection to be integral to our idea of a mature human being.

Also abandoned is the idea of fraternity as an emotional bond linking members of the community, at least if that is understood literally, on the model of brotherhood. The new version still makes room for loyalty and emotional attachments, but the object of attachment is more abstract—a nation, the embodiment of a public culture. I may feel strongly attached to Britain, but it is absurd to suppose that I could feel fraternally towards every individual Briton. Size alone would ensure this, even if complexity of relationship did not. Reasoned conviction is also given a larger role to play in generating ties. I am committed to my compatriots partly because I am committed to the principles and policies that we have worked out together politically. [ . . . ]

Some elements in the radical vision are preserved. We have held on to the claim that a person's identity should be constituted, in part, by his membership of a collectivity, and shown how nationality and citizenship together can meet this demand. We have also seen how citizenship embodies an equality of status, and to that extent meets the radical ideal of egalitarian community. Finally, citizenship provides a moral underpinning for distribution according to need, and at the same time the practical means for realizing this ideal on a society-wide basis.

Whether the form of socialism I have sketched should be described as 'communitarian' is in the end a matter of definition and taste. To the extent that 'community' conjures up a 'natural' form of association, based on physical proximity and traditional ties—Tönnies's idea of *Gemeinschaft*<sup>31</sup>—some other term is preferable. Again, if community is thought to imply unitary relationships in the sense explained earlier, our proposals do not embody it. If, however, we follow recent debates in assuming that community has centrally to do with the constitutive role of social relationships in personal identity, then we have gone some way towards showing that market socialism can indeed be communitarian. [ . . . ]

<sup>31</sup> See F. Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, trans. as *Community and Association* (London, 1955).

## FEMINISM AND MODERN FRIENDSHIP: DISLOCATING THE COMMUNITY

MARILYN FRIEDMAN

A predominant theme in much recent feminist thought has been the critique of the abstract individualism which underlies some important versions of liberal political theory.<sup>1</sup> Abstract individualism considers individual human beings as social atoms, abstracted from their social contexts, and disregards the role of social relationships and human community in constituting the very identity and nature of individual human beings. Sometimes the individuals of abstract individualism are posited as rationally self-interested utility maximizers.<sup>2</sup> Sometimes, also, they are theorized to form communities based fundamentally on competition and conflict among persons vying for scarce resources, communities which represent no deeper social

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. C. Pateman, *The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critique of Liberal Theory* (Berkeley, Calif., 1979); Z. Eisenstein, *The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism* (New York, 1981); N. C. M. Hartsock, *Money, Sex, and Power* (Boston, 1983); A. M. Jaggar, *Feminist Politics and Human Nature* (Totowa, NJ, 1983); N. Scheman, 'Individualism and the Objects of Psychology', in S. Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds.), *Discovering Reality* (Dordrecht, 1983), 225-44; J. Flax, 'Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics', in Harding and Hintikka (eds.), *Discovering Reality*, pp. 245-81; and S. Benhabib, 'The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory', in E. F. Kittay and D. T. Meyers (eds.), *Women and Moral Theory* (Totowa, NJ, 1987), 154-77.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. D. Gauthier, *Morals by Agreement* (Oxford, 1986).